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Department of Economics and Business and Centre for Research on Local Government
Economics (COELO), University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Local governments can increase size in particular policy ﬁelds through cooperation
with other local governments. This is often thought to improve eﬃciency, but there
is little empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. We study the case of the
Netherlands, which has been a veritable laboratory of intermunicipal cooperation
(IMC), using panel data for 2005–2013. We ﬁnd no evidence that IMC reduces total
spending of the average municipality. Indeed, IMC seems to increase spending in
small and large municipalities, leaving spending in mid-sized municipalities unaf-
fected. In one speciﬁc ﬁeld, tax collection, spending may be reduced through IMC.
Spending in this ﬁeld is low, which may explain why total spending is unaﬀected.
Instead of lowering spending, municipalities may have used possible cost savings
as a result of IMC to improve public service levels. We do not ﬁnd evidence
substantiating this hypothesis, however.
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Introduction
According to Oates’ (1972) theorem, assigning the task of providing public
services to subnational jurisdictions increases welfare, because it allows services
to be tailored to local preferences. Allowing every community to choose its
own mix of public services and taxes results in higher welfare than nationally
uniform service provision. Decentralised service provision is not without dis-
advantages, however. The production of public services may be characterised
by economies of size. Moreover, spillovers to neighbouring municipalities may
distort the local trade-oﬀ of costs and beneﬁts. As a result, optimal jurisdiction
size is diﬀerent for diﬀerent public services.
In practice, local governments have found two ways around this problem. In
the ﬁrst place, the production of many public services is contracted out to
private ﬁrms which, by working for more than one local jurisdiction, can
operate at a larger scale. Alternatively, public–private partnership may be
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used. Contracting out requires a competitive market, which does not exist for
all services for which local governments are responsible. In practice, results of
contracting out and public–private partnership are often disappointing (Bel,
Fageda, and Warner 2010; Andrews and Entwistle 2010).
In the second place, local governments can cooperate with other local
governments to provide public services. Intermunicipal cooperation (IMC) has
becomewidespread, both in Europe and in the US. IMCmay helpmunicipalities
that are simply too small to perform every task independently. IMC is often
introduced with the aim of realising size-related eﬃciency gains (Hulst and Van
Montfort 2007; Bartolini and Fiorillo 2011; Teles 2016). Indeed, it is often the
need to cut cost that instigates cooperation (Kwon and Feiock 2010; Bel and
Warner 2016). However, the cost-cutting potential of IMC is, so far, nothing
more than an assumption. The eﬀects of IMC on government spending and
eﬃciency are not yet extensively studied.
In theory, IMC may improve eﬃciency if the production of public services is
characterised by economies of size. In larger organisations, ﬁxed costs can be
spread out over higher production volumes, and a more extensive division of
labour may improve productivity. On the other hand, corporate governance
theory predicts that IMC increases agency (or transaction) costs and reduces
the extent to which public servants are monitored (Allers and van Ommeren,
2016; Van Genugten 2008). To begin with, IMC introduces an extra tier in the
hierarchy: the board of the intermunicipal organisation (IO). This increases mon-
itoring costs. Second, monitoring is reduced because a local government has a
weaker grip on an IO than on its own organisation. Finally, IMC reduces the
incentive to monitor because the costs are borne by the local government doing
themonitoring, while the beneﬁts are spread over all participatingmunicipalities
(common pool problem). Thus, corporate governance theory predicts that pos-
sible eﬃciency gains from IMC will be at least partly oﬀset by losses through
increasing monitoring costs and the resulting reduction in monitoring.
Applying public choice theory results in a prediction in the opposite direc-
tion (Sørensen 2007). In this view, citizens are unable to eﬀectively monitor
their elected administrators, who will exploit this by using public resources to
further their own interests (rent seeking). Because politicians are further
removed from decision-making within IOs, and because politicians from more
than one municipality are involved, it is probably more diﬃcult for a particular
politician to misuse an IO’s resources. Thus, IMC could be eﬃciency enhancing,
even if no economies of size exist.
Because theory does not provide a clear prediction, the question whether
IMC improves eﬃciency needs to be answered empirically. However, relatively
few studies exist, andmost focus on a single public service (garbage collection).
This study adds to the literature by studying the eﬀects of IMC in the
Netherlands, which, in the past decades, has seen a surge of IMC in diﬀerent
policy ﬁelds, making this country an ideal testing ground. Our main analysis
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studies the eﬀect of IMC on total per capita municipal spending. We start by
measuring IMC by the amounts municipalities spend through IOs. In additional
regressions, we measure IMC using dummy variables indicating whether muni-
cipalities cooperate in certain policy areas, and by the increase in size (mea-
sured by population) as a result of IMC. Because small municipalities are more
likely to proﬁt from scale increases than large municipalities (Bel and Warner
2015), we also test whether our results vary by municipality size.
Next, we study the eﬀect of cooperation in one particular policy ﬁeld, tax
collection, in more detail. We single out this ﬁeld because the capital-intensive
nature of tax collection leads us to expect that savings from IMC, if they exist,
would be especially likely here. Because the share of tax collection spending in
total spending is low, we do not use total municipal spending as a dependent
variable here, but tax collection spending.
Our results indicate that IMC does not reduce municipal spending, with the
exception of joint tax collection. Because tax collection costs are a minor item on
the municipal budget, it is not surprising that these savings do not noticeably
impact total spending. However, the outcome that cooperation does not reduce
aggregate spending does not necessarily imply that IMC does not improve
eﬃciency. Instead of using cost savings to lower spending, municipalities may
use them to ﬁnance more or better public services. Therefore, we also look for
evidence of an eﬀect of IMC on public service levels.
Unfortunately, municipal service provision cannot be measured directly.
Instead, we use changes in house prices as an indicator for changes in service
levels. This is based on a vast economic literature which indicates that
amenities like schools, parks and shopping centres (and disamenities like
noise and pollution) capitalise into house prices (see, e.g., Fishel 2001, and
the references therein). Homebuyers are prepared to spend more in locations
that have more to oﬀer. Municipalities are important providers of amenities,
although certainly not the only ones. Previous empirical studies have estab-
lished that higher intergovernmental grants to municipalities result in higher
house prices, both in England (Hilber, Lyytikäinen, and Vermeulen 2011) and
in the Netherlands (Allers and Vermeulen 2016). With more money to spend,
municipalities can aﬀord more or better public services and become more
attractive to homebuyers. From this literature, we take the notion that
(potential) savings resulting from IMC may be spent, just like extra grant
money, on public services which capitalise into house prices. However, our
empirical analysis shows no eﬀect of IMC on house prices, implying that we
ﬁnd no evidence of eﬃciency gains attained through IMC.
Previous empirical studies
Considering the fact that municipal cooperation is widespread, the dearth of
empirical studies into its ﬁnancial eﬀects is surprising. Of the few empirical
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studies available, most focus on a single public service. Bel and Warner
(2015) survey the literature and ﬁnd eight econometric studies of the eﬀect
of IMC on public service cost or spending. All focus on solid waste services,
in one case combined with water, electricity and gas provision. The results
were mixed; both positive, negative and insigniﬁcant results are reported.
Blaeschke and Haug (2014) study the eﬀect of IMC on eﬃciency in waste-
water disposal in a German state. They ﬁnd that economies of size are
limited, and that IMC is characterised by lower technical eﬃciency than
self-provision.
In the Netherlands, cooperation in the ﬁelds of tax collection and solid
waste collection has been studied. Niaounakis and Blank (2017) conclude
that IMC increases cost-eﬃciency in tax collection. Dijkgraaf and Gradus
(2013) ﬁnd that IMC reduces spending on garbage collection (although
only at the 10% conﬁdence level). In a later study, Dijkgraaf and Gradus
(2015), this eﬀect disappears.
A diﬀerent approach was taken by Allers and van Ommeren (2016): instead
of studying all costs of providing a single service, they focus on a single cost
(credit) in a broad range of public services. The authors conclude that, in the
Netherlands, IOs pay higher interest rates than municipalities, while there is no
economic reason to do so. As the beneﬁts of lower interest rates outweigh the
extra bargaining cost they would require, the higher interest paid by IOs is
interpreted as a form of ineﬃciency. The number of participatingmunicipalities
did not seem to aﬀect the interest rate paid by an IO. Thus, it is cooperation as
such that aﬀects eﬃciency, not the number of parties involved. Allers and van
Ommeren (2016) conclude that the most probable explanations are the intro-
duction of extra hierarchical layers through IMC, and the limited inﬂuence of
municipality governments on IO boards.
Still, a diﬀerent approach was chosen by Frère, Leprince and Paty (2014),
who study the eﬀect of IMC on total spending of French municipalities. They
ﬁnd no eﬀect, either positive or negative. This outcome is similar to that of
studies of the budgetary eﬀects of municipal amalgamation. Recent studies in
the Netherlands (Allers and Geertsema 2016) and Denmark (Blom-Hansen et al.
2016) found no eﬀect of amalgamation on total municipal spending. Earlier
studies found either higher or lower spending after amalgamation (see Allers
and Geertsema 2016, for references).
That amalgamation does not seem to aﬀect spending may not come as
a surprise. Amalgamation does not necessarily change the operating scale
of the organisational units that produce public services (Blom-Hansen et al.
2016). It does not automatically result in, e.g., bigger schools or bigger
medical centres. Cooperation is diﬀerent in this respect: it is aimed speci-
ﬁcally at production units, not administrative units. Therefore, in ﬁelds
where economies of size exist, cooperation may be a better way to exploit
these.
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Institutional set-up
The Netherland has 408 municipalities (in 2013). These are democratically gov-
erned jurisdictions with considerable autonomy over spending decisions, carry-
ing out a broad range of government tasks. Municipalities spend about 10% of
GDP. In the last decades, various public responsibilities have been transferred
from the central to the local government level. As a result, the focus of munici-
palities’ activities has shifted from infrastructure to social services. With over
40,000 inhabitants on average, Dutch municipalities are relatively large. This is
due to municipal amalgamation. In the last decades, municipalities have been
transferring an ever-increasing part of their activities to IOs.
IOs are funded by the participating municipalities. IOs do not levy own taxes.
In some cases, IOs receive an intergovernmental grant from the central govern-
ment. However, participating municipalities are responsible should any ﬁnancial
deﬁcits arise. Municipalities are free to enter or leave IOs, except in a few
well-deﬁned policy areas where IMC is mandatory, e.g., ﬁre protection. IMC
takes diﬀerent forms (Hulst and Van Montfort 2007). Under the Joint Provisions
Act, municipalities may create public bodies. These are separate administrative
entities thatmay employ staﬀ, own assets and borrowmoney.Municipalitiesmay
also create public companies under private law. Several other kinds of IMC exist as
well, such as foundations and informal consultative bodies.
Data
Weuse panel data from 2005 to 2013. Amounts are per capita, expressed in euros
of 2013using the consumer price index. For the econometric analysis, all variables
except dummies are converted into logarithms. We rebuilt the data set in such a
way that amalgamations are retroactively applied to the data. To this end, we
usedmunicipalities as they existed in 2013 as units of observation, and for earlier
years combined data from municipalities that merged within our data period.
IMC is measured in diﬀerent ways. In our main analysis, we use IMC
spending per capita as an explanatory variable. IMC spending is calculated
by adding the amount amunicipality spends on IO governance to the amount
it transfers to other subnational government units, both according to its own
accounts as reported by Statistics Netherlands.1 Data on total municipal
spending and on population size are taken from Statistics Netherlands as
well. For some municipalities, spending data are not available for all years in
our research period (see Table 1).
Figure 1 shows IMC spending in our research period. IMC spending per
capita (left-hand panel in Figure 1) increased sharply from 2005 to 2008. After
that, the economic crisis caused an overall reduction in local government
spending. Per capita IMC expenditure increases with municipality size. As a
share of total spending (right-hand panel in Figure 1), IMC spending has been
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES 131
increasing from 7% on average in 2005 to 18% in 2013. The trend has been
similar for municipalities of diﬀerent sizes, but the levels diﬀer. The share of IMC
in total spending decreases with municipality size.
For four individual policy ﬁelds (welfare provision, sheltered work, garbage
collection and tax collection), we collected data on cooperation. We used several
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Dependent variable
Total expenditure 3332 2475 13.1 736 7097
Spending on tax collection 3362 22.7 0.19 0.03 198
Cooperation variables
IMC spending 3441 367 3.95 0.48 1806
Dwelfare 3443 0.33 0.008 0 1
Swelfare 3443 2.21 0.04 1 19
Dgarbage collection 3443 0.43 0.008 0 1
Sgarbage collection 3443 7.60 0.37 1 433
Dtax collection 3443 0.18 0.007 0 1
Stax collection 3443 3.12 0.12 1 77
Control variables
Intergovernmental grant 3401 776 3.1 298 2783
Inhabitants 3443 37,471 722 932 505,568
Address density 3442 0.96 0.01 0.11 4.7
Welfare share 3442 0.026 0.0002 0.0066 0.08
Share of left-wing parties 3442 0.49 0.004 0 1
Political fragmentation 3442 0.21 0.0009 0.096 0.59
Share of coalition in council 3442 0.62 0.002 0.24 0.97
Pre-election year 3443 0.32 0.008 0 1
Election year 3443 0.22 0.007 0 1
Post-election year 3443 0.22 0.007 0 1
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Figure 1. IMC spending in euro per capita (left) and as percentage of total spending
(right) for diﬀerent municipality sizes.
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publicly available data sets that provide data on some IOs in some years and
extended these data through a survey among all municipalities. We kept sending
reminders until we had data for all municipalities. We use these data to construct
dummy variables indicating whether a municipality cooperates in a particular
ﬁeld, indicated (for welfare) as Dwelfare. For each policy ﬁeld, we also create a
variable reﬂecting the size increase through IMC, indicated (for welfare) as Swelfare.
This increase is calculated as the number of inhabitants served by the relevant
IMC divided by the number of inhabitants of the municipality itself. The merit of
this variable is that it can diﬀerentiate betweenmunicipalities attaining large and
small size increases through cooperation, relative to their own size.
We found that IMC in sheltered work provision shows little variation:
virtually, all municipalities cooperate. Therefore, we drop IMC variables
related to sheltered work from our data set. Together, the three remaining
policy ﬁelds, welfare, garbage collection and tax collection, involve 19% of
Dutch municipal spending in 2013.
The data set is enriched with several control variables. These include per
capita non-earmarked grants received from the central government (‘algemene
uitkering’), number of inhabitants, address density and share of inhabitants on
welfare (all from Statistics Netherlands). We also use several political control
variables: the share of left-wing parties in the municipal council, the Herﬁndahl
index of political fragmentation, the share of the parties forming the local
coalition in the municipal council and three dummy variables indicating
whether the previous year, the current year or the year after that is an election
year (source: Centre for Research of Local Government Economics). Table 1
presents descriptive statistics.
Model and econometric issues
The most straightforward model we use is the standard ﬁxed eﬀects model:
Ei;t ¼ βx0i;t þ γθt þ δit þ μi þ εi;t (1)
where Ei;t is total per capita expenditures for municipality i in year t, x0i;t is a
matrix of explanatory variables, θt is a year dummy, t is a municipality-speciﬁc
linear time trend accounting for local trends, μi is a municipality-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀect accounting for invariant local contextual inﬂuence that is not measured
by our model and εi;t is a component for potential idiosyncratic shocks.
However, municipal expenditures are highly dependent on spending
levels in previous years, because important expenditure categories like
wage costs, interest and depreciations can only change gradually over
time. Therefore, our main model includes a lagged dependent variable:
Ei;t ¼ αEi; t1 þ βx0i;t þ γθt þ μi þ εi;t: (2)
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Estimation of such a dynamic model involves several econometric issues.
First, with an OLS estimator, the lagged dependent Ei; t1 would be corre-
lated with the ﬁxed eﬀects and introduce a dynamic panel bias (Nickell
1981). Second, for our data set, x0i;t does not strictly consist of exogenous
variables. IMC spending is linked to total municipal spending since it is part
of the municipal budget. Moreover, we cannot rule out reverse causality.
Dutch municipalities have been under pressure to increase eﬃciency. Thus,
expenditure levels may inﬂuence the desire to cooperate. To the best of our
knowledge, there are no valid external instruments available for these
variables, so endogeneity problems can only be dealt with by drawing
instruments from our existing data set.
To deal with these issues, we use the General Method of Moments
(GMM), which is speciﬁcally designed and widely used to estimate dynamic
models using panel data sets with a large N and a small T, such as ours
(Roodman 2009). The standard GMM method, also referred to as diﬀerence
GMM, transforms the model using ﬁrst diﬀerences and changes it into a
system of equations, where each time period has its own equation and set
of lagged diﬀerences used as instruments. This resolves the Nickell bias
because it expunges ﬁxed eﬀects from the model, and it allows for the
formation of instruments from earlier observations of the diﬀerences.
Main analysis
The full model (before GMM transformation) that we use in conjunction with
the diﬀerence GMM approach is the following:
Ei;t ¼ αEi; t1 þ βx0i;t þ δx0i;t þ γθt þ μi þ εi;t: (3)
The diﬀerence with Equation (2) is that x0i;t is now a matrix of strictly
exogenous control variables, while w0i;t is a matrix of potentially endogenous
variables, which in the main analysis contains one variable: IMC spending.
After diﬀerencing this becomes
ΔEi;t ¼ αΔEi; t1 þ Δβx0i;t þ Δδw0i;t þ Δγθt þ Δεi;t: (4)
The μi term is expunged because it is time invariant, and the dynamic panel
bias is removed. ΔEi; t1 and Δδw0i;t will be instrumented by ΔEi; t2 and
Δδw0i;t2, respectively, and earlier lags of these two terms, to avoid correla-
tion with the vi;t1 term in Δvi;t . The year dummies and the exogenous
control variables enter the instrument matrix in traditional IV-style as a
transformed single column.
Due to the risk, inherent to GMM, of overﬁtting instrumented variables,
we take several precautions (Roodman 2009). We limit the number of lags
used to instrument the lagged dependent and the endogenous variables.
134 M. A. ALLERS & J. A. DE GREEF
We also run regressions with ‘collapsed’ instrument matrices to conﬁrm
whether results are robust. Furthermore, we test for ﬁrst and second-order
autocorrelation using the Arellano–Bond autocorrelation test, and we test
instrument validity using Hansen and Diﬀerence-in-Hansen tests.
Analysis using alternative measures of IMC
The next step in our analysis is to replace per capita IMC spending by sets of
variables that measure IMC within three diﬀerent policy ﬁelds, as described
in the Data section. We take this extra step to test whether the results are
robust to measuring IMC in diﬀerent ways. First, we use dummy variables
indicating cooperation in the three policy ﬁelds; next, we use variables that
measure the size increase attained through cooperation.
There is no solid theoretical basis to predict whether these extra IMC variables
are exogenous or not. Municipalities with higher spending levels could be more
likely to start cooperating in multiple policy ﬁelds to reduce costs. However, it
could also be argued that reverse causality between total spending and the
decision to cooperate in a given policy ﬁeld might be unlikely, since high
spending is just as likely to be caused by problems in diﬀerent policy ﬁelds.
For size increase, the inﬂuence of total spending on IO size relative to the
municipality’s own size is arguably even less likely, as IO size depends on the
availability of potential cooperating partners and their size. To account for both
options – exogeneity and endogeneity –we run both regressions where the sets
of IMC variables are treated as part of the matrix of exogenous variables x0i;t , and
regressions where we include them in the matrix of endogenous variables w0i;t .
Do eﬀects of IMC depend on jurisdiction size?
Several authors have shown that the eﬀect of IMC may depend on the size
of a municipality (Bel and Fageda 2006; Bel and Mur 2009). We estimate the
inﬂuence of municipality size on the eﬀect of IMC by introducing interaction
terms to our main analysis, as part of the matrix containing potentially
endogenous variables, w0i;t .
Eﬀect of IMC on collecting taxes
As another extension, we repeat the analysis with the dummy and size
increase variables for tax collection, but this time, we do not use total
spending, but spending on tax collection as a dependent variable. This is
possible because, for this policy ﬁeld, suﬃcient data on spending and on
control variables are available. Tax collection, which includes property
assessment, is an interesting ﬁeld because it is highly automated, which
means that any eﬃciency gains of IMC are most probably found here.
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However, as spending in this ﬁeld is low as a percentage of total municipal
spending (0.4%), this may not show up as an eﬀect of IMC on total
spending.
Eﬀect of IMC on service levels
Instead of lowering expenditures, eﬃciency gains as a result of IMC could
present themselves in the form of improved service provision in the areas
where municipalities cooperate. Additionally, municipalities could choose to
use any ﬁnancial gains through IMC to improve service provision in other areas.
In both cases, a failure to ﬁnd lower spending after IMC could lead to the false
conclusion that no eﬃciency gains have been realised. In an attempt to shed
some light on this, we extend the main analysis by replacing the dependent
variable, total spending, with an indicator for municipal service provision.
Unfortunately, public service levels cannot bemeasured directly, partly because
municipalities produce a plethora of outputs, many of which are diﬀuse, and
partly because output data on potentially quantiﬁable services are not always
available. Using only output data on the few services where output can be
measured, e.g. garbage collection, would seriously compromise our exercise, as
these services are clearly not representative for the entire municipal output.
To circumvent this problem, we use the notion that public services make
a municipality more attractive to potential homebuyers. Recent empirical
studies in England and in the Netherlands show that changing intergovern-
mental grants to municipalities result in corresponding changes in house
prices (Hilber, Lyytikäinen, and Vermeulen 2011; Allers and Vermeulen 2016).
Presumably, extra grant money is used to improve public services which
capitalise into house prices. The same may be true for money saved through
IMC. Following Allers and Geertsema (2016), we estimate a hedonic regres-
sion of house prices on a large selection of house characteristics, using data
on all housing transactions over our period of observation that were con-
ducted by members of the Dutch Association of Realtors (NVM), which
covers the majority of all owner-occupied housing transactions in the
Netherlands.2 Using the regression results, we calculate the mean price of
a house with average characteristics. The resulting variable reﬂects the
value, for every year in our data set, of a location in a particular municipality.
Changes in service levels may result in changes in this value.
This standardised house price is then used as our dependent variable to
substitute total spending. We estimate a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects model as
given in Equation (2) with the bias-corrected Least square dummy variable
(LSDV) method (Kiviet 1995). Control variables are left out here because
contemporaneous changes in socio-economic composition may be driven
by changes in house prices, so that variables that correlate with socio-
economic composition are ‘bad controls’ (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
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Because the level of service provision might inﬂuence the desirability of
cooperation, we also use GMM to estimate a model as described by
Equation (4), where IMC spending is part of the matrix of endogenous
variables w0i;t .
Results
Table 2 presents results from our analysis of the eﬀect of IMC on total municipal
spending. The ﬁrst Column shows the results from a ﬁxed eﬀects regression,
without lagged dependent variable, as described in Equation (1). The coeﬃ-
cient of IMC spending is positive and signiﬁcant. Using GMM according to
Equations (3) and (4) does not change this coeﬃcient, but it does not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀer from zero any more (Column 2). Adding control variables hardly
aﬀects the coeﬃcients of IMC spending or their signiﬁcance (Columns 3 and 4).
We believe the GMM model in Column 4 to be the most suitable for our
main analysis, given the available data and the potentially endogenous
nature of the IMC spending variable.3 Speciﬁcation tests conﬁrm the validity
of the estimation approach.4 Repeating Regression 4 with collapsed instru-
ment matrices conﬁrms that the GMM results are robust (Appendix 2a in the
Supplemental material). The lagged-dependent variable is strongly signiﬁ-
cant, as expected.5 The control variables show coeﬃcients that are unsur-
prising for diﬀerenced models using within-variation. Because they are not
very informative, we do not report standard control coeﬃcients in the
remainder of this paper.
Our regressions show that IMC spending does not have a robust signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on total municipal spending. More speciﬁcally, when the levels of
IMC expenditures increase or decrease, there is no statistically signiﬁcant
corresponding change in the levels of total expenditures. The coeﬃcients
are positive in every regression, but not statistically signiﬁcant when GMM is
used. In general, IMC does not seem to be an eﬀective method to reduce
spending for Dutch municipalities.
It is conceivable, however, that it takes time before municipalities man-
age to achieve any potential beneﬁts of IMC. Therefore, we repeat the
regressions in Table 2, using lagged IMC spending. With either 1 or 2-year
lags for IMC spending, regressions still show an eﬀect that is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (Appendix 2b in the Supplemental material). Apparently,
no spending reductions materialise 1 or 2 years after increasing IMC
spending.
Results using diﬀerent measures of IMC
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 present the results of regressions similar
to those in Table 2, where the dependent variable, IMC spending, is replaced
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by dummies indicating cooperation in three diﬀerent policy areas. Columns
4–6 show the results of regressions with the IMC-induced size increase of
service provision for these policy areas as the dependent variable. Two of
these policy areas, welfare and garbage collection, together account for
about one-ﬁfth of total municipal spending. Tax collection is much smaller
(0.4% of total spending), which makes an eﬀect of cooperation in this area
on total spending unlikely. Tax collection is included here for completeness
only, because we delve deeper into this area below.
In Table 3, we use the same diﬀerence GMM method as in Table 2,
including control variables and year dummies for all regressions. Once
more, we also report estimates of ﬁxed eﬀects models. The dependent
variable is again total municipal spending, in order to ﬁnd out whether
these results show similar outcomes as our main analysis. Because the
theoretical case for endogeneity of the IMC variables used in Table 3 is
Table 2. Eﬀect of IMC on total municipal spending.









Lagged dependent 0.19*** 0.19***
(4.93) (4.84)
IMC spending 0.04*** 0.04 0.04*** 0.05
(4.01) (1.15) (4.07) (1.44)




Address density −0.14 −0.06
(−0.53) (−0.23)
Welfare share −0.01 −0.04
(−0.20) (−1.09)
Share of left-wing parties −0.02 0.00
(−0.95) (0.07)
Political fragmentation −0.04 0.00
(−1.36) (0.02)
Share of coalition in council 0.00 0.01
(0.07) (0.34)
Pre-election year 0.03 0.04**
(1.25) (2.18)
Election year 0.03 0.05
(0.84) (1.09)
Post-election year 0.06** 0.05*
(2.10) (1.88)
Observations 3331 2474 3297 2450
Municipalities 392 392 388 388
Instruments 33 43
Hansen df 24 24
Hansen χ2 value 20.3 19.9
Hansen p value 0.68 0.70
Variables are expressed in logarithms; z-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses;
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. See Appendix 2a in the Supplemental material for collapsed results
for Column 4.
GMM: General Method of Moments.
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less clear than in the case of IMC spending used in Table 2, as explained
above, we also show the results for regressions where we treat IMC variables
as exogenous (i.e., not as part of w0i;t).
Whereas the ﬁxed eﬀects estimations in Table 2 showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect
of IMC on spending, this is not the case in Table 3. Regardless of speciﬁcation, in
Table 3, cooperation shows no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on total municipal spend-
ing, with one exception. In Column 5, there is a positive eﬀect for cooperation in
garbage collection on total spending. However, this eﬀect is not robust.
Collapsing the instrument matrix does not change much (Appendix 3a
in the Supplemental material). We also test for delayed eﬀects but ﬁnd none
(Appendices 3b and 3c).
The regressions in Table 3 include all municipalities, whether they cooperate
in the relevant area or not. In eﬀect, the analysis compares spending changes in
municipalities that start cooperating in the relevant ﬁeld with spending
changes in municipalities that do not. This last category includes two diﬀerent
groups: municipalities that start cooperating in a diﬀerent year in our data set,
and municipalities that do not cooperate, in that ﬁeld, in any year in our data
set. Table 4 presents the outcomes of regressions run with only those munici-
palities that cooperate in the relevant policy ﬁeld in at least 1 year within our
data period. Thus, the control group now consists of municipalities that do not
Table 3. Eﬀect of IMC dummies and size increase on total municipal spending.






















Lagged dependent 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.17***
(4.92) (3.96) (4.93) (3.38)
Dwelfare −0.02 −0.02 −0.05
(−0.97) (−0.67) (−0.57)
Dgarbage collection 0.02 0.02 0.14
(0.75) (1.26) (1.57)
Dtax collection −0.00 −0.00 −0.03
(−0.10) (−0.08) (−0.38)
Swelfare −0.01 −0.01 −0.03
(−0.63) (−0.80) (−0.35)
Sgarbage collection 0.01 0.01** 0.01
(0.62) (1.97) (0.19)
Stax collection −0.00 0.00 0.01
(−0.37) (0.00) (0.13)
Observations 3298 2450 2450 3298 2450 2450
Municipalities 388 388 388 388 388 388
Instruments 33 69 33 69
Hansen df 12 48 12 48
Hansen χ2 value 7.7 51.4 7.8 48.4
Hansen p 0.81 0.34 0.80 0.46
Variables are expressed in logarithms; z-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses;
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05. Control variables included (see Column 4 of Table 2).
GMM: General Method of Moments.
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cooperate in a particular year but do cooperate at a diﬀerent moment. This
makes both groups more comparable.
Panel A of Table 4 measures IMC through dummy variables, Panel B
through the (population) size increase realised by cooperating. Again, there
is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of IMC on spending,6 with one exception. The dummy
variable indicating whether a municipality cooperates in the ﬁeld of welfare
provision has a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient. However, this result is not
robust: it is not found in Panel B of Table 4, nor in regressions with collapsed
instrument matrices (Appendix 4b in the Supplemental material).
Impact of municipality size
Having established that cooperation has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on municipal
expenditure levels on average, we ask whether such an eﬀect might exist for
Table 4. Eﬀect of IMC dummies and size increase on total municipal spending; only
municipalities that cooperate in the relevant policy ﬁeld.
(1) (2) (3)
Welfare Garbage collection Tax collection
Panel A: IMC dummies








Observations 1014 1260 874
Municipalities 165 198 140
Instruments 43 43 43
Hansen df 24 24 24
Hansen χ2 value 22.8 18.4 24.8
Hansen p 0.53 0.78 0.42
Panel B: IMC size increase








Observations 1014 1260 874
Municipalities 165 198 140
Instruments 43 43 43
Hansen df 24 24 24
Hansen χ2value 20.3 29.0 15.6
Hansen p 0.68 0.22 0.90
Variables are expressed in logarithms; z-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses;
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05. Diﬀerence GMM two-step estimation using lags 2–3. Control variables
included (see Column 4 of Table 2). Cooperation variables treated as endogenous.
IMC: Intermunicipal cooperation.
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speciﬁc population sizes. One might surmise, e.g., that very small cooperating
municipalities are more likely to proﬁt from potential economies of size than
large municipalities. To investigate this, we interact IMC spending with number
of inhabitants and include this variable in the regression of Table 2, Column 4.
The regression results are shown in Appendix 1 in the Supplemental material.
Using these results, we created Figure 2. The downward sloping solid line in
Figure 2 shows the marginal eﬀect of IMC spending on total spending for
diﬀerent population sizes. The bar chart at the bottom of the Figure represents
a histogram of the number of observations of diﬀerent (log) population size.
These show that the most relevant part of the graph runs roughly from 9 to 12.
Outside this range, there are few observations.
Using a strict 95% conﬁdence level while interpreting Figure 2 (dotted lines),
we conclude that the eﬀect of IMC on total spending is not statistically diﬀerent
from zero for any municipal size. If we accept a slightly lower conﬁdence level,
however, we might deduce that an increase in cooperation raises total spend-
ing for the smallest municipalities.
The above interpretation of Figure 2 is based on the assumption that the
marginal interaction eﬀect is linear. However, per capita spending is often
thought to follow a u-curve (and eﬃciency an inverted u-curve), with small
and large organisations showing high spending levels and lowest spending
levels at intermediate sizes. Although no ﬁrm evidence for such a u-curve














































































Figure 2. Marginal eﬀect of IMC spending on total spending for diﬀerent population sizes.
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(Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Yiqing 2017). We estimate marginal eﬀects for
diﬀerent groups of observations, sorted by number of inhabitants.
The red dots in Figure 2 (and their 95% conﬁdence intervals indicated by
horizontal red bars) show the marginal eﬀect for the smallest third of the
municipalities, for the middle third and for the largest third, respectively.
Together, these dots suggest a u-curve, but as the conﬁdence intervals sur-
rounding these dots overlap, linearity cannot be rejected. Smaller municipali-
ties (the smallest 33%) seem to spend slightly more as a consequence of an
increase in IMC. A 10% increase in IMC spending would result in an increase of
total spending of around 0.3% for these municipalities. A similar expenditure-
increasing eﬀect is found for the largest 33% of all municipalities. For mid-sized
municipalities, we see no eﬀect of IMC on municipal spending.
Eﬀect of IMC on tax collection expenditures
Results of earlier research in the Netherlands suggest that cooperation in the
ﬁeld of tax collection increases cost-eﬃciency (Niaounakis and Blank 2017).
As explained above, such an eﬀect is unlikely to aﬀect total spending, due to
the small share of tax collection spending in the total budget of a munici-
pality. Tables 3 and 4 conﬁrm this. This area is of particular interest, because
work processes are highly automated. This means that ﬁxed costs (computer
hardware and software) are relatively high. If there are policy ﬁelds where
economies of size exist, this is probably one of them.
To delve deeper into this, we regress not total spending but spending
associated with tax collection on IMC indicators. Data limitations restrict us
from also applying this method to the other policy areas. For tax collection,
the necessary data on spending and control variables are available. All
Dutch municipalities levy a property tax, which is the main source of local
tax revenue. Additionally, municipalities are allowed to levy other taxes, but
only those that are enshrined in national law. Costs associated with tax
collection depend largely on the number of taxable properties in a munici-
pality and on the types of taxes that are levied. To capture this, we add four
extra control variables. These measure the number of residential properties,
the per capita value of non-residential properties and whether or not a
municipality taxes dog ownership or tourism. Because tax collection (as
opposed to tax policy) rarely involves political choices, we do not include
political controls here.
Table 5 shows the results. We use IMC dummies for the ﬁrst two regres-
sions, and size increase through cooperation for the last two regressions.
Columns 1 and 3 present results from regressions that treat IMC as exogen-
ous. These suggest that cooperation results in signiﬁcant reductions in per
capita expenditures in this area. Municipalities that cooperate manage to
reduce spending on this task by roughly 15% on average (Column 1).
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Alternatively, doubling the population that is served through cooperation
reduces spending by 6%. Fixed eﬀects estimations yield similar outcomes
(Appendix 5a in the Supplemental material). Columns 2 and 4 of Table 5,
however, paint a diﬀerent picture. Here, IMC is treated as endogenous, and
no signiﬁcant eﬀect is found.
Analogous to Table 4, we repeat the regressions in Table 5, excluding
municipalities that do not cooperate in tax collection in any year in our data
set. Thus, we compare municipalities that cooperate with municipalities that
do not cooperate in that year, but that do cooperate in at least 1 year in the
period under study. Consequently, both groups are more comparable.
Table 6 shows the results. Now, all speciﬁcations show a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect of IMC on spending. Using ﬁxed eﬀects yields the same
result (Appendix 5a). As shown by the test statistics (low Hansen p values),
however, the instruments in the estimates with endogenous IMC speciﬁca-
tion (Columns 2 and 4 of Table 6) may not be valid. Thus, if the IMC variables
are exogenous, it reduces spending. If they are endogenous, we cannot tell.
As argued above, exogeneity is more likely here than in regressions where
IMC spending is the independent variable, in particular when the indepen-
dent variable is scale increase through IMC. Therefore, we believe that tax
cooperation reduces spending in that area.
Eﬀect of IMC on service levels
Our results so far suggest that IMC does not aﬀect total spending for the
average municipality. For small and for large municipalities, however, IMC
may lead to slightly higher spending levels. And for speciﬁc policy ﬁelds like
Table 5. Eﬀect of tax cooperation on tax collection expenditure.









Lagged dependent 0.43*** 0.37*** 0.43*** 0.34***
(6.31) (4.19) (6.37) (4.54)
Dtax collection −0.15*** −0.15
(−2.93) (−0.59)
Stax collection −0.06** 0.13
(−2.50) (0.76)
Observations 2487 2487 2487 2487
Number of code 389 389 389 389
Number of instruments 38 59 38 59
Hansen df 21 42 21 42
Hansen χ2 value 26 51.6 25.8 46.2
Hansen p 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.30
Variables are expressed in logarithms; z-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses;
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05. Diﬀerence GMM two-step estimation using lags 2–5. Control variables
included. See Appendix 5b in the Supplemental material for results with collapsed instrument matrix.
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tax collection, spending may be reduced through IMC. What should we
make of this? IMC-induced spending increases in small municipalities
could point to increases in service levels. Possibly, small municipalities are
unable to carry out certain tasks satisfactorily when operating alone, while
cooperation enables more professional processes with higher standards.
Moreover, savings from cooperation in, e.g., tax collection may be used to
improve services in diﬀerent ﬁelds.
As explained, municipal output levels cannot be measured satisfactorily,
so we cannot test this directly. Instead, we test whether changes in IMC
spending result in changes in house prices, building on evidence that
suggests that public services capitalise into house prices (Hilber,
Lyytikäinen, and Vermeulen 2011; Allers and Vermeulen 2016). A positive
eﬀect would suggest that IMC improves public service levels.
Table 7 presents the results of regressions with house prices as the
dependent variable. Because deteriorating service levels could increase the
desire for cooperation, we run two regressions. In Column 1, we treat IMC
spending as exogenous. In Column 2, we treat IMC spending as endogenous
to house prices, and instrument it as such. The regression in Column 1 uses
the same bias corrected LSDV estimator as Allers and Geertsema (2016)
utilise when studying the eﬀect of amalgamations on house prices. The
regression in Column 2 uses diﬀerence GMM.
As expected, Column 1 of Table 7 shows that average house prices within
a municipality strongly depend on their levels in the previous year. The
results in Column 2 show that past changes in house prices are not as strong
a predictor for current changes, but still signiﬁcant. More importantly
though, the results of both regressions clearly indicate that spending on
Table 6. Eﬀect of tax cooperation on tax collection expenditure; only municipalities
that cooperate in the relevant policy ﬁeld.









Lagged dependent 0.41*** 0.31*** 0.42*** 0.29***
(4.88) (3.04) (5.04) (3.36)
Dtax collection −0.14*** −0.21***
(−2.71) (−2.64)
Stax collection −0.06** −0.13***
(−2.33) (−2.82)
Observations 891 891 891 891
Number of code 141 141 141 141
Number of instruments 38 59 38 59
Hansen df 21 42 21 42
Hansen χ2 value 25.7 63.6 25.5 61.4
Hansen p 0.22 0.02 0.23 0.03
Variables are expressed in logarithms; z-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses;
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05. Diﬀerence GMM two-step estimation using lags 2–5. Control variables
included. See Appendix 6 in the Supplemental material for results with collapsed instrument
matrices.
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IMC has no impact on house prices. The coeﬃcients are zero in both
regressions. These outcomes remain unchanged if we utilise lagged values
of IMC spending to account for a potential delayed eﬀect (Appendix 7
in the Supplemental material). Note, however, that the Hansen p value in
Column 2 of Table 7 (and in Column 1 in Appendix 7) indicates that the
instruments may not deal satisfactorily with endogeneity.
Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence for the hypothesis that changes in IMC
spending aﬀect service levels. Obviously, this does not prove that IMC has
no such eﬀect. It only shows we cannot observe any. One could surmise,
e.g., that IMC improves services for households that do not own their home.
Recall that the average house prices we use are calculated using transaction
data of owner-occupied housing.
Conclusion
We study the eﬀects of IMC on expenditure levels of Dutch municipalities in
2005–2013. We measure IMC in three diﬀerent ways: by per capita spending
through IMC, by dummies for the existence of IMC in particular policy ﬁelds
and by the increase in operating size which results from cooperating in
these ﬁelds. Whatever measure we use, our results provide no empirical
basis for the assumption, common among policymakers, that IMC reduces
spending or increases eﬃciency. We ﬁnd that IMC does not aﬀect total
spending for the average municipality. For small and for large municipalities,
however, IMC might lead to slightly higher spending.
This does not mean that IMC can never reduce spending. We pay special
attention to a particularly capital intensive policy area: tax collection. If
economies of size exist at all, they are likely to be found here. We ﬁnd
that spending in this ﬁeld may indeed be considerably reduced through
Table 7. Eﬀect of IMC spending on house prices.
(1) (2)
Bias corrected LSDV Diﬀerence GMM
Lagged dependent 0.97*** 0.32*
(27.62) (1.72)
IMC spending −0.00 0.00
(−0.65) (0.48)
Observations 2733 2349
Number of code 366 366
Number of instruments 43
Hansen df 34
Hansen χ2 value 45.3
Hansen p 0.10
Variables are expressed in logarithms; z-statistics based on robust standard errors in
parentheses; ***p < 0.01, *p < 0.1. Diﬀerence GMM two-step estimation for
Equation (2) using lags 2–4.
IMC: Intermunicipal cooperation; GMM: General Method of Moments.
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IMC. Because of the small share of tax collection in total municipal spending,
it is not surprising that cooperation in this ﬁeld does not aﬀect total
municipal spending in our regressions.
The desire to cut back spending is not the only possible motivation for
cooperation among municipalities. IMC may alternatively be aimed at
improving public services. The IMC-induced spending increases we ﬁnd for
some groups of municipalities could be driven by improvements of public
services, especially in small municipalities. Possibly, small municipalities are
unable to carry out certain tasks satisfactorily when operating alone, while
cooperation enables more professional processes with higher standards.
Alternatively, higher spending as a result of IMC could point to less
eﬃciency. Allers and van Ommeren (2016) present evidence that IOs are
less eﬀective in minimising costs. They attribute this to the introduction of
extra hierarchical layers through IMC, and the limited inﬂuence of munici-
pality governments on IO boards, both of which reduce monitoring. As
municipal output levels cannot be measured satisfactorily, we cannot test
this in a direct way. Instead, we use an indirect indicator.
Previous studies show that municipalities that receive more grant money
from the central government see a proportional rise in house prices, presum-
ably because the extra money is spent on public services that make a munici-
pality more attractive to potential homebuyers. The same may be expected in
municipalities that can spend more on public services because of savings
resulting from IMC. We investigate whether changes in IMC spending result
in corresponding changes in house prices. A positive eﬀect would suggest that
IMC improves public service levels. However, we ﬁnd no eﬀect of IMC on house
prices. Of course, this does not prove that service provision is not improved by
IMC. We have no evidence that it does. If IMC does not reduce spending or
improve service levels, it does not enhance eﬃciency.
This study adds to the as yet limited body of empirical studies on the
ﬁnancial eﬀects of IMC. We extend the analysis beyond garbage collection,
which dominates previous studies. We use diﬀerent IMC indicators, diﬀer-
entiate according to municipal size and attempt to indirectly test whether
IMC aﬀects service provision. To what extent the results may be generalised
to diﬀerent institutional settings is unclear. Bel and Warner (2015) stress that
type of public service, output or population size and institutional design are
of crucial importance in obtaining cost savings from cooperation. Therefore,
more research is needed in diﬀerent settings, to enable researchers to derive
the factors that determine success. This would enable them to inform
policymakers about the expected eﬀects of cooperation in speciﬁc cases.
This would be especially useful for governments that are considering
whether to cooperate or to amalgamate in order to increase operating size.
For now, policymakers considering IMC should realise that cost savings
may be elusive and that spending may actually go up instead of down.
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Much will depend on the production technology used. For capital-intensive
services like tax collection, prospects are best. In social services, economies
of size may not exist or be negligible.
Notes
1. We use realised, not budgeted, amounts.
2. We do not report the regression results; they are very similar to those in Allers
and Geertsema (2016).
3. In appendices, we also show the outcomes for regressions with collapsed
instrument matrices for lagged dependents and w0i;t . These results can be
compared with the outcomes from the non-collapsed regressions we report,
as a safeguard against potential overﬁtting. In order to limit the number of
instruments, we restrict the number of lags used. For the lagged dependent,
we instrument the diﬀerences with lags 1 and 2 of the diﬀerences. For w0i;t , we
instrument the diﬀerence with lags 2 and 3 of the diﬀerence. Since the lagged
dependent already contains γi; t1, this means that both the lagged dependent
and Δδw0i;t are instrumented with diﬀerenced data from the same levels: t − 2
and t − 3. We have tested multiple speciﬁcations with diﬀerent lag levels
before choosing this speciﬁcation. Using extra lag levels as instruments does
not change the outcomes but does result in less favourable Hansen test
results. For regressions in later tables, we sometimes use diﬀerent lag levels,
but we always indicate below the tables which lagged levels are used, and we
always use the same levels for both the lagged dependent and w0i;t .
4. The Hansen χ2 values and the Hansen p values in Table 2 suggest that our
instruments are valid. Based on the Arrelano–Bond AR(2) test, we can also
conclude that using lag 2 (and up) is safe, since all these tests strongly indicate
that there is no second-order autocorrelation present while using the model
with these speciﬁcations. Values for all AR(2) tests from all regressions in ﬁrst
diﬀerences presented show z scores close to 0 and probabilities between 0.8
and 1. We will not report this again for other regressions.
5. The coeﬃcient of approximately 0.2 shows that our dependent variable is not
stationary, conﬁrming that a diﬀerence GMM approach is preferable over a
system GMM approach, since one of the key assumptions for system GMM is
violated (Roodman 2009).
6. Using a ﬁxed eﬀects model instead of GMM ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀect either
(Appendix 4a in the Supplemental material).
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